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AUTOMOBILE COLLISIONS AT
INTERSECTIONS
By Kenneth V. RileyJUDGE DENISON pointed out in a recent article in Dicta
that in these modern times a lawyer is paid more to be a
prophet than an orator. It is obvious to every lawyer that
an understanding of the chain of antecedent legal opinions
bearing upon the issues involved, is essential to an intelligent
prophecy upon the outcome of any contemplated legal con-
troversy.
I like to think of these cases as landmarks or blazes on
the trees along the trail through the deep woods of legal spec-
ulation to a correct conclusion. A traveler strikes out through
a strange forest to reach a certain destination many miles away.
If some woodsman has gone before and left his tell-tale blaze
upon a tree from time to time along the trail, and the traveller
is heedful in following the blazes, he is fairly certain to reach
his destination. But if he fails to heed them, he will become
lost. Just so, the lawyer must traverse the forest of legal -spec-
ulation. He has knowledge of a few fundamental legal prin-
ciples to help him. But if he does not follow the trail marked
by the legal precedents, he is very likely to lose his way and
fail to reach the proper destination.
The case-law on most subjects reaches back for many
years, even, centuries, into the past. But automobiles are a
comparatively modern invention, and consequently automo-
bile law, which in many respects had no counterpart in ante-
cedent law, is also of fairly recent origin. In the days of horse
drawn vehicles there were no collisions at street intersections
resulting in law-suits. But now-a-days, such collisions occur
every day between automobiles. This has resulted and con-
tinues to result in a vast amount of litigation. Our State Su-
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preme Court in the short space of a dozen years, has built up
a system of case-law on this subject, which, if studied and un-
derstood, will greatly assist the lawyer in predicting the out-
come of contemplated legal controversies.
The first automobile intersection case which reached the
Supreme Court of this State was Livingston v. Barney, 62
Colo. 528, decided in 1917. In that case Livingston was rid-
ing a motorcycle west on Twenty-sixth Avenue approaching
its intersection with Downing Street in Denver. Barney was
driving south on Downing Street, towards Twenty-sixth Ave-
nue. Livingston entered the intersection and at some point
therein collided with Barney's automobile. It was between
six and seven o'clock in the evening and quite dark. Barney's
car had side lamps lighted but no headlights. Livingston
sued Barney and testified at the trial that he didn't look to
the right when he entered the intersection, "but that he looked
straight ahead without turning either to the right or left".
The trial judge granted defendant a non-suit on the ground
that under the municipal ordinance granting the right of way
to the vehicle on the right, it was the positive duty of plain-
tiff to look to the right before he crossed the intersection. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, making the following
interesting comment: (p. 532)
"From the testimony which plaintiff himself gave it appears that on en-
tering Downing Street he failed to look either way, and it also appears there-
from that his view was unobstructed. Had his vision been in any manner cut
off, or interfered with, or had he looked or otherwise attempted to avoid in-
jury, then the question might have been one of fact for the jury. But he failed
totally to observe, by not looking to the right, the duty imposed upon him by
positive law, as set forth in the ordinance. In addition he violated the law
of self preservation founded on instinct, by which anyone driving on a pubic
street is required at all times to use the faculties with which nature has en-
dowed him to avoid injury."
This case settled that a driver who fails to look to the right
at an intersection cannot recover. But as will be seen, it left
other important questions undetermined.
At that time I think it was quite generally the opinion of
lawyers and laymen alike that despite the right of way rule
and ordinance, the first car into the intersection had the right
of way. In Golden Eagle Go. v. Mockbee (1920) 68 Colo.
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312, an action arising out of an automobile collision at a Den-
ver street intersection, Judge Butler, now on the Supreme
Bench, instructed the jury in accordance with this prevalent
understanding. In logical accord with this view the judge
further instructed the jury that: (p. 314)
"It was the duty of defendant's driver, in approaching the intersection,
to look to the left to see whether any vehicle was approaching the intersection
from that direction, and to so keep his car under control as to enable him to
accord the right of way to the plaintiff, if she should reach the intersection
before he reached the intersection."
On appeal the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Den-
ison, said:
"This instruction is erroneous, because it repeals the ordinance and be-
cause it is impracticable."
The Court succinctly explained its position as follows: (p.
314)
"It repeals the ordinance or rather inverts it, because since the rules of
the road in cities require every vehicle to travel on the right hand side, the
right hand car, when both are at or near the border of the street intersection,
will be much nearer the intersection of the tracks of the two cars, the point of
possible collision, than the left hand car will be; it follows that whenever the
two cars are approaching at equal or nearly equal distances. from that point
(which is the only time when collision is likely) the right hand car must yield
because the left hand car will reach the .street intersection first; thus the right
of way in practically all cases, except where no collision could occur anyway,
is transferred from the right to the left."
The court deemed the instruction impracticable because in
many cases in which collision is likely, if the drivers wait to
see which will reach the intersection first, it will be too late to
consider the right of way; and because to require every driver
to look both right and left to see whether any of the cars on
either side will touch the street intersection before or with
him is impracticable. The court announced the correct rule
to be as follows:
"We think the right rule is that it is the duty of every driver, when
approaching a street intersection, to use reasonable care to see whether there
is likelihood of collision with any car approaching from the right, and, if there
is, to yeld to it the right of way and to keep his car under such control that
he can do so. Livingston v. Barney, 62 Colo. 528, 163 Pac. 863; Colo. etc.
Ry. Co., v. Cohen, 66 Colo. 149, 180 Pac. 307. The court below was clearly
right however in warning the jury that the one having the right of way is not
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absolved from reasonable care, and we think that the driver who has not the
right of way is entitled to assume that the car on the right is not approaching
at a negligent rate."
The above stated rule seems plain enough and yet lawyers
and judges have found perplexities in, its application. For
instance, when if ever, is a driver justified in proceeding across
an intersection in front of a car approaching on his right?
Again, under what circumstances can a driver who has not
the right of way assume that the car on his right is not ap-
proaching at a negligent rate?
Rosenbaum v. Riggs, 75 Colo. 408, decided in 1924,
throws further light on the last stated question. This case
arose out of an intersection collision which occurred in the
City of Sterling. Plaintiff Riggs was on the left. He testi-
fied that he had reached the center of a fifty foot street, going
not to exceed ten miles per hour, and could have stopped with-
in five or six feet, when he saw defendant's car to his right
about one hundred feet back, approaching at about forty miles
per hour. He knew it was coming fast, but thought he had
no reason to stop. The case went to the jury and plaintiff got
judgment. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court re-
versed the judgment. That court pointed out that under plain-
tiff's testimony, "it was very apparent that if neither one of
them stopped, or slackened speed, there would be a collision".
(p. 410.) It continued: (p. 410)
"The defendant, being at the right of the plaintiff, had the right of way,
and it was plaintiff's duty to recognize that, having the right of way, she might
not slacken speed. Under the ordinance he should have given her the right
of way, and decreased his speed so that she could pass the point of intersection
in safety. It appears from his evidence that he assumed that, because he was
well towards the center line of the street, he had the right of way, thus, as
this court said in Golden Eagle Co. v. Mockbee, 68 Colo. 312, 189 Pac. 850,
inverting the procedure prescribed by the ordinance."
The court then referred to Livingston v. Barney, supra,
and held that the plaintiff in that case, who failed to look, was
no more negligent than the plaintiff in this case, "who knew of
the approach of the defendant's car, and is presumed to have
known that it had the right of way, and yet took a chance of
getting across in advance of the other car". (p. 411)
In concluding its opinion the court said: (p. 411)
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"Under the authority of the above cases we hold that the court erred in
refusing to give instruction No. 2, requested by defendant, which was that,
'It was the duty of the plaintiff to look to the right, and the evidence is that
if he had so looked he would have seen the car in time to have stopped, and if
he saw defendant's car in time to stop but neglected to do so, he was guilty of
contributory negligence and therefore cannot recover'."
The above was a case where a plaintiff saw and appreciated
the speed of the car on his right, which fhct was stressed in the
opinion. Yet in view of some of the language in the opinion,
and especially in view of the instruction approved therein, the
question arose whether there ever could be an intersection col-
lision in which the driver on the left could recover.
This question was touched upon but left unanswered in
the next case, St. Mary's Academy v. Newhagen, 77 Colo. 471,
decided in 1925. The car of plaintiff Newhagen, coming into
Denver on the Littleton paved road, was struck by the def end-
ant's car coming from the right at a speed of thirty or forty
miles an hour-a negligent rate. Plaintiff's car was proceed-
ing at twelve to fifteen miles an hour, and the driver saw de-
fendant's car when she was about a hundred feet from the
intersection and recognized its speed, yet she shifted her gaze
to the left and drove into the intersection without looking
again to the right. Plaintiff sued defendant for damages re-
sulting from the ensuing collision and was permitted to re-
cover in the lower court. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment, and held the plaintiff's driver guilty of negligence
as a matterof law because she failed to accord the right of way
to defendant's car coming from the right, though she saw and
appreciated that it was approaching at a negligent rate. The
court in commenting on the Golden Eagle case supra, said:
(pages 472-473)
"We there suggested that the driver who has not the right of way is
entitled to assume that the car on his right is not approaching at a negligent
rate. That suggestion has been held to be the law in Grant v. Marshall (Del.
Super.) 121 Atl. 664; but the question before us now is whether the plaintiff,
having looked to the right and seen the defendant's car, and having seen that
it was approaching at a negligent rate, has the right to assume that it- Vill
slow down and approach the intersection at a careful rate and upon that as-
sumption pay no further attention to it. We cannot assent to this proposi-
tion."
It is interesting to note that the opinion in this, as in the
earlier decisions of our Supreme Court, cites and relies upon
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the preceding Colorado cases, whereas the doctrine of the only
foreign case referred to is ignored. It is also interesting to
observe that even after the above decision was handed down,
lawyers were still puzzled as to when, if ever, a driver on the
left could recover, if he had looked and had seen the car on
his right approaching at a speed which, in reality, was exces-
sive, but which he claimed not to have recognized as such.
Then came the decision in Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150,
handed down in 1927, which seemed to add to the perplexity.
In that case the plaintiff was non-suited by the trial judge.
His evidence disclosed that defendants were driving north on
Broadway in Denver in a drunken condition at a highly ex-
cessive speed at two o'clock in the morning. Plaintiff was
proceeding south on Broadway at a lawful speed and in the
exercise of due care. He turned to the left across Broadway
in front of defendant's car. Then, to quote from the opinion:
(p. 153)
"As he started to turn he saw the approaching lights of the Phillips
(defendant's) car 100 yards away but had no reason to, and did not believe
that it was exceeding the speed limit. He was handicapped by the night, the
lights, the location of the cars, and falling snow. Defendant's car was in fact
approaching at 45 miles an hour, its driver was drunk and reckless, he did not
signal, slow down, turn or use his brakes."
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the
case for submission of the issue of contributory negligence to
a jury.
The court first distinguished the preceding cases above
noted and then announced its ruling in the following emphatic
language: (p. 154)
"We are now asked to fix responsibility in every case of automobile
crossing collision in favor of the car having the right of way under the strict
provisions of statute, ordinance, or rule of the road, notwithstanding drunk-
enness, gross negligence and excessive speed, and notwithstanding every rea-
sonable precaution exercised by the other under circumstances which the first
driver knew, or should have known, would in all probability prove ineffectual;
to outlaw every left hand driver and give carte blanche to every right hand
driver to run him down. The mere statement of the proposition is its own
refutation. We know of no court that has ever countenanced it and we ex-
pressly repudiate it."
The court finally stated that whether the plaintiff should have
noted the excessive speed of the defendant's car was a question
of fact for the jury.
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At this point lawyers and trial judges alike were divided
into three groups with respect to their opinions on this sub-
ject. One group contended that the Boyd case overruled the
preceding cases (though obviously it did not), and that thence-
forth in every trial the plaintiff on the left, who had looked to
the right was privileged to go to the jury on the question of
contributory negligence. The second group held that when-
ever the plaintiff testified that he had looked to the right and
had not recognized that the approaching car was coming at
an unlawful speed, such plaintiff had a right to go to the jury
on the question of contributory negligence. The third group
contended that in the absence of special circumstances, as in
the Boyd case, which might justify the plaintiff in misjudging
the speed, the plaintiff was bound at his peril to see and recog-
nize that the car on the right was coming at an excessive speed.
The last case on the subject was handed down in March
of this year. In the opinion in that case, Kracaw v. Micheletti,
et al., Colo. 276 (p. 333), the court states the facts as follows:
(p. 334)
"The 'accident occurred in broad day light. The undisputed evidence
discloses that defendant, having the right of way, was driving excessively fast;
that plaintiff was traveling at a moderate speed; that when she reached a point
about fifteen feet from the easterly curb line of Pearl Street, she saw defend-
ant's car approaching about two hundred feet distant; that she continued to
watch defendant's car, but could not tell its speed; that thinking she had time
to cross ahead of it, she failed to yield the right of way to defendant and the
collision ensued."
The court held the plaintiff guilty of contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law, saying: (p. 334)
"No reasonably prudent person in plaintiff's position would have failed
to recognize the fact that defendant's car was approaching at an excessive and
negligent rate of speed. Plaintiff cannot be heard to say that she failed to recog-
nize the speed of defendant's automobile."
This opinion appears to vindicate the opinion of the third
group mentioned above.
One should not rashly assert that these cases settle the
legal questions arising from automobile collisions at inter-
sections, in view of the myriad possibilities of variations in
facts. But it can be said again in conclusion that a study of
them should assist the practitioner materially in acquiring skill
as a legal prophet.
DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
Annual Outing and "Bar-Olympics"
Place Mt. Vernon Country Club, Lookout Mountain.
Date July 11, 1929.




4:30 P.M.-Bench vs. Bar Baseball Game.
6:15 P.M.-Dinner.
7:45 P.M.-Pollock's Circus.
9:00 P.M.-Presentation of prizes.
Having received assurances that the Mt. Vernon Coun-
try Club would provide a good dinner this year, the commit-
tee, after considering all the suggestions heretofore made
relative to the situs of this chose in action, decided that no
other place combined the advntages presented by this club.
The Mt. Vernon Country Club is most easily reached
by way of the Mt. Vernon road (cross the West Colf ax viaduct
and proceed in a due westerly direction to the southwesterly
turnout near the Rifle Range, and then turn to the right at
the junction of the Mt. Vernon and Lookout Mountain roads.
The club entrance is on the westerly side of the Lookout
Mountain road, approximately one mile from the point where
the Mt. Vernon road is left. Large cards will be placed along
the road to guide those who are unfamiliar with the route).
Anyone not having transportation can secure it by giving
timely notice to James N. Sabin, 402 Midland Building.
The golf, tennis, bridge and horse shoe tournaments will
start at 2:30 sharp. Ben Sweet will manage the golf tourna-
ment. Will Shafroth will be in charge of the tennis tourna-
ment. Hick Walker is in charge of the horse shoe competi-
tion, and Jim Sabin will look after the bridge players. Bob
More will call Captain Bob Steele, of the bench team, and
Captain Bob Bosworth, of the bar team, to the baseball field
at 4:30 P.M. where Umpire Dick Fillius will endeavor to
keep the thirsty players from reaching the keg on third base
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in any but the approved way. Henry McAllister, Jr., is Major
Domo of the evening events, and will be ring master of Abe
Pollock's five ring circus.
By reason of a large gratuity placed at the disposal of the
committee for this outing, it has been possible to furnish a din-
ner, prizes, court and green fees, evening entertainment, and
every facility of the club for the moderate price of $2.00 per
person. Albert J. Gould will be registrar and collector of
money. Upon payment of said sum of $2.00, buttonhole tags
will be furnished similar to those employed at the University
Club when football returns are being had. Everyone is to
proceed at once to the club house upon arrival, purchase his
credentials, and immediately advise the appropriate officials
what activities he intends to participate in, in case no notice
has previously been given to Chairman Phelps.
A few days before July 11 each member of the associa-
tion will receive his or her individual copy of this announce-
ment and postcards upon which to designate whether or not
transportation is desired, and what events the member desires
to participate in. (As was stated in the first announcement,
the outing is for members of the bar alone; husbands and wives
who are not lawyers cannot be accommodated. Children are
not wanted.)
Those who attended the outing last year will remember
the confusion occasioned by last minute entries in the sporting
events. The tournaments cannot be run off smoothly unless
the one in charge knows prior to 2:30 P.M., July 11, who the
participants will be. We urge most insistently, therefore, that
every member of the bar give written notice of the selected
activities to Jack Phelps, 725 Ernest and Cranmer Building.
As the baseball game commences at 4:30 it will be possible for
one to finish golf, tennis, bridge, or horse shoes, and then take
part in the ball game. It will not be possible, however, to
compete for the tournament prizes in more than one of the
four tournaments last mentioned. That is, one may play golf
and baseball, tennis and baseball, etc., but may not be a can-
didate for both golf and tennis prizes, bridge and horse shoe
prizes, etc.
A very pleasurable afternoon and evening is assured to
everyone. The golf course is a sporty one, the tennis courts
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are good, the horse shoe and croquet grounds are in splendid
condition. Those who attended last year know that the loca-
tion of the Mt. Vernon Country Club is convenient and the
surroundings stimulating and beautiful. Real talent has been
secured for the evening entertainment. Even if you cannot





HORACE F. PHELPS, Chairman.





The Association's Librarian reports the following books
missing from the Library. The Librarian will appreciate in-
formation in regard to them.
29 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure.
19 and 38 Corpus Juris.
18 Ruling Case Law.
226 Pacific Reporter.
Fuller's Interstate Commerce.
Allen's J. P. Manual.
13 and 21 Colorado Court of Appeals.
13 Colorado.
TE DEUM FOR LEGISLATIVE BLESSINGS
By R. Hickman WalkerN O citizen, well disposed toward the Commonwealth, can
glance through the pages of Holland's Legislative
Service without an involuntary thanksgiving for the
27th General Assembly.
When that assembly convened, there existed in the state-
unmarked by many heedless citizens-69 emergencies, and the
public peace, health, and safety were immediately threatened
at 76 distinct points. Where, I ask you, was our press, where
our pulpit-recently not reticent in the face of public danger
-to let us walk about in that fancied security? Where was
this Association, where its head, that it and he were silent
while crisis trod upon the heel of crisis, and disorder, famine,
and pestilence stalked abroad in the land?
But all is well now. The clouds that lowered about our
house are in the deep bosom of the ocean buried. The county
court of Moffat County, just in the nick of time, had three
of its terms amputated, and no further rioting in that quarter
is anticipated. The doors of school cafeterias have opened,
while school-children, though gnawed with hunger, could yet
stagger in. El Paso County, none too soon, is snatched into
Class One, Division. A, for county commissioners' fees, and the
National Guard may be withdrawn from that county. Pro-
vision is made for the instant vaccination of diseased bees.
Banks, near bursting from overstuffed vaults, are ministered
to by cutting their reserve requirements five per cent.
That old, and divinely ordained relationship-that dear,
close tie-that binds the certified public accountant to his
client, is placed, where it belongs, on a level with the mar-
riage bond, and beyond profanation by district attorneys,
whose salaries are raised in atonement for loss of access to
that sweet confidence. Gum machines and telephone coin
boxes are brought within the King's peace. The walls of the
Smith Hollow Game Refuge rise like magic against the bul-
lets that were lawful when they left the barrel. The office of
Irrigation Division Engineer in Irrigation District No. 1-
that vile cancer that has been eating at the very heart of our
body politic-is abolished. State Hail Insurance bests the
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summer storms. And the march of the Mormon cricket is
halted on the very banks of the Fraser River.
Not only, however, for these immediate reliefs-but for
constructive statutes, coming more slowly into operation and
with space allowed for adjustment to their revolutionary re-
quirements-are we thankful.
Gradually, not as by a wrench, are we to become accus-
tomed to paying $5.00 to the clerk for a divorce decree with
alimony provision. We are granted 90 days to prepare for
that. And how wise were those skilled artificers of proce-
dural law, Senators Quiatt, Knauss, and Fairfield, that they
did not thrust upon our surprised and unready souls the far-
reaching innovations of their Senate Bill No. 215. We have
yet four days left to accommodate our practice to it. It deals
with summons and the publication thereof, and if you will
study it closely, if you will compare it repeatedly with the
text of the present law-there will come upon you, about the
time of the sixth perusal, a staggering sense of the funda-
mental changes which it has wrought. Contrast the work-
manship of this statute with the clumsiness of the lay-drawn
House Bill No. 580-the latter designed to revive the mining
industry of the State. Whereas House Bill No. 580 contains,
excepting a general repealing clause, only one section of one
short sentence, Senate Bill No. 215 contains 3 sections, with
several subdivisions, with sentences longer than those author-
ized by the new Baumes law.
But there can be no doubt that Senator Quiatt and his
associates have accomplished their purpose. You may now
get your order of publication from a judge, or a court, under
act of the legislature, whereas before you could get it from
a court or a judge, under Rule 14A of the Supreme Court.
You don't have to depend upon the Supreme Court rule any
more. There is restored to you the privilege of saying, if you
don't want to be nasty, that the defendant conceals himself to
avoid service-instead of letting him off by averring ignor-
ance of his whereabouts. But more than that, the phrase which
Robinson and Company has illicitly inserted in the summons,
"or if by personal service outside the state, then within 50
days", need no longer be bootlegged. More important than
all, whereas the old form of summons allowed you but a
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quarter of an inch for the name of the plaintiff, now you can
bring a suit for a Russian, or for Henry Toll's law firm, with-
out having to telescope your letters.
Now that you have looked upon that picture, look upon
this-House Bill No. 580. I have time to quote it:
"Section 1. That no action shall be brought or main-
tained for the recovery of mining or placer property unless
such action be brought within a period of two years from the
commencement of the defendant's actual possession; provided,
however, that the defendant to such action was in actual pos-
session of the property, and had performed work and labor
thereon for six months of each year throughout such actual
possession, and provided, further, that such possession was
based upon tax deed purchased from the treasurer wherein
such properties were located, and provided, further, that if
such tax deed was issued and purchased in good faith, no tech-
nical error in the issuance of such tax deed shall destroy the
validity thereof or shall defeat the purposes and spirit of this
act."
No lawyer's prolixity there-just the plain, blunt lan-
guage of the old prospector. But what worlds of meaning!
You want to develop mining and so you go up into the Dis-
trict and run some old fogey, who has been retarding the
industry, off his claim with force and arms. He sues you the
next day. This statute is your shield. Just plead that the ac-
tion was not commenced within two years from the com-
mencemerrt of the act of possession under a tax deed-make
it stronger by saying that there never was a tax deed on the
property. You must prevail.
The 27th General Assembly manifested a sensibility to
the progress of the learned professions. Under its wise en-
actment, the requirements for admission to the profession of
barbering have been raised, until they are now not very much
higher than those required for lawyers. Good moral char-
acter must he now have who brandishes his razor before your
throat, or to whom you trust, as to a fiduciary, the interest of
your few remaining hairs. The beautiful relationship of bar-
ber and customer will soon have its testimonial privilege, too,
and no secret divulged while in the chair, gag in mouth, will
be available against you. Not only good moral character, for
DICTA
the barber, too, must be able to read intelligently and write
clearly the English language. No additional conversational
abilities with the language are prescribed. Pharmacists and
abstracters, also, now know that good moral characters are
very favorably regarded by our legislators-in their collec-
tive capacity.
But the feature of the last legislative season, which, more
than any other, challenges the interest and admiration of the
student of constitutional or public law, is the struggle which
it developed between the legislative and the judicial branch,
upon a question of profound public policy. That question
deeply affects our social fabric. It relates to the institution
of marriage. Both the General Assembly and the Supreme
Court were in favor of marriage. But the General Assembly
was in favor of more marriages than the Supreme Court. Ac-
cordingly, in 1927 it authorized the guilty spouse to terminate
the relation and prepare himself for a new one. The court,
however, was not to be frustrated, and in the Walton case it
still saw the uncleanliness upon the hands which the Legisla-
ture had washed. It questioned the power of the Legislature
to control its sight. But that body stoutly stood and fought
back with Senate Bill No. 99, and the issue might now be in
doubt, if under the rules the legislature were not required to
return home, and leave the arena to the court alone for two
years more. This is not the time nor the place to express any
views as to the merits of the controversy. The antagonists
have treated each other with courtesy, the court having assured
the assembly that it did not question its right to enact a Code
of Civil Procedure, and the assembly by its closing provision
in Senate Bill No. 215 having recognized the right of the Su-
preme Court to make rules; and so-the only question is,
whose rule prevails?
But I cannot abstain from expressing some sympathy
with the legislative declaration in Section 2 of Senate Bill
No. 99: "It is against public policy to have the marriage un-
decided." The last end of the marriage relationship is en-
titled to the same clarification as the first end of it. It is no
less cruel to keep a man in doubt whether he is a divorcee, than
whether he is a bridegroom.
A CALENDAR OF TAX PROCEDURE
IN COLORADO
WITH REFERENCES TO SECTIONS IN 1921 COMPILED LAWS
By Erl H. Ellis
THE TAX LEVY
ASSESSMENTS BY ASSESSOR
Of Property not owned by
Public Utilities.
January 1
As soon as possible after this
date Assessor is to call on each
inhabitant of County a n d
leave assessment blank. 7225.
These blanks are prescribed





Of Property of Public Utili-
ties (Defined 7362).
March 1 to April 1
In this period public utilities
must file annual statements
with Tax Commission on
forms furnished by Commis-
sion. 7294 to 7302.
ril 1
The lien for all taxes attaches on this
date. 7180. Personal property is taxed:
where found on this date. 7249.
April 1 to May 20
In this period each inhabitant
of County must deliver com-
pleted tax schedule to Asses-
sor. 7225.
(Assessor making assessments)
First Monday in April
Tax Commission starts meet-
ings to determine assessments
of Public Utilities. 7284.
June 15
Last day for Tax Commission
to complete assessments of
Public Utilities and to certify
distributions of same to Coun-




This is the start of
which the taxes are
First Tuesday in August
Last day for Assessor to mail
to persons whose assessments
changed from their return a
statement of changes in valua-
tion. Also last day to publish
notice of time when Assessor
will sit to hear objections to
his assessments. 7291.
Objections filed to assessments
with Assessor must be in writ-
ing. 7291, 7292, 7293.
September 1
Last day for Assessor to com-
plete his Assessment Roll and
Abstract of Assessment and
to send copy of latter to Tax
Commission.
First Tuesday in September
Before this date the Assessor
must have concluded all hear-
ings on objections before him.
7291. The County Board of
Equalization starts its First
Meeting, to make adjustments
in assessments, sitting 3 to 10
days. 7458. Assessor sub-
mits his assessments to County
Board. 7310.
Third Tuesday in September
Second Meeting of County
Board of Equalization starts,
the Fiscal Year for
levied. S. L. 1929.
August 25
Last day for Public Utilities
to file protests with Tax Com-
mission as to assessments
made. 7287.
Second Monday in September
Tax Commission starts i t s
hearings upon complaints
filed as to assessments it has
made. 7287.
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to hear complaints as to
changes made at First Meet-
ing and to equalize among
taxpayers. 7458.
October 1
Last day for Tax Commission
to determine whether proper-
ty of Counties is assessed at
full cash value. 7352. Tax
Commission sends its state-
ment on this to State Board of
Equalization. 7352. This
State Board certifies t h e
changes it approves to the
Counties. 7354. Tax Com-
mission has broad powers to
change assessments. 7334. It
may direct the remission of
illegal taxes and may correct
errors. 7335.
First Monday to Third
Monday in October
The prescribed period for the
State Board of Equalization
to meet and to examine and to
equalize assessments. 7463.
It must complete the equali-
zation in this period and send
the Counties statements of the
changes made in the assess-
ments. 7465.
October 1
Last day for Tax Commission
to reach determination on
complaints against its assess-
ments. 7287.
(Query: May the State Board
of Equalization deal with
assessments made by Tax
Commission? This ques-
tion involved in pending
litigation.)
First Monday in November
On this date the County Commissioners
are to levy the tax, or fix the tax rate.
7457.
January 1
The last day on which the Assessor may
DICTA
deliver the Tax List to the County Treas-
urer. 7317.
First Monday in January
A. Assessments over $7500.
Last day to perfect appeal
from Assessor's overrul-
ing of protest. Appeal is
to District or County
Court. 7292.
First Monday in January
Last day to appeal to the
County or District C o u r t
from decision of Tax Com-
mission. 7287.
B. Assessments under $7500.
Last day to perfect appeal
from Assessor's overrul-
ing of protest.' Appeal is
to Board of County Com-
missioners. Further ap-
peal from the County
Commissioners to the Dis-
trict Court may be taken.
7293.
Last Day of February
First half of tax due, and penalties start
to accrue, unless whole tax is paid before
end of April. 7190.
April 30
Last day that entire tax may be paid with-
out penalty. S. L. 1927, p. 682.
June 30
This is the end of the Fiscal Year under
discussion. S. L. 1929.
July 31
Last day for payment of second half of
tax without penalty. 7190.
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August 1
All unpaid taxes now delinquent. 7386.
Refund
The Board of County Commissioners,
with the approval of the Tax Commis-
sion, may refund or rebate illegal taxes.
7460. Suit may be brought to force the
County Commissioners to refund an il-
legal tax and this is the proper method
of testing most tax questions. 7447.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Foundation for the Advancement of the Social
Sciences is planning a series of noon luncheon discussions of
foreign affairs, to be held on Fridays in the Colorado Hall
of the Cosmopolitan Hotel. The first one will be held on Fri-
day, June 28, and the others on the successive Fridays in July.
Lecturers who speak with authority upon the subjects under
consideration are being secured to open the question in formal
address. In some instances where the question is controver-
sial, two speakers will be present to give opposing sides. The
speeches will always be followed by discussion and questions.
The plan is modeled somewhat after the celebrated Foreign
Policy Association luncheons held in New York City on alter-
nate Saturday afternoons, which are attended by a thousand
or more of the leading citizens of New York City.
REPORT OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE
COMMITTEE
HE new courthouse committee of this association makesTthe following report: That on March 12, 1929, con-
tracts for complete construction of the new courthouse
were made as follows:
1. General Complete Contract, including
decorations, light fixtures and floor coverings, to
Varnum & Bate, of Denver, and Fleisher Engi-
neering & Construction Company, of Chicago ...... $4,250,000.00
2. Heating and Ventilating to McCarty-
Johnson Heating & Engineering Company, of
D env er ......................................................................................................... 28 1,4 25 .00
3. Plumbing and Sewerage to Cullyford
Plumbing and Heating Company, of Denver --------- 52,754.00
4. Electrical Contract to Sturgeon Electric
C om pany, of D enver ........................................................................ 70,800.00
Total, $4,654,979.00
The building is approximately 435 feet by 273 feet, with
a full basement, and four complete floors, covering almost the
entire block of ground (500 feet by 320 feet) upon, which the
building is constructed. The approximate height of the en-
trance portico of the building is ninety feet, equivalent to an
ordinary seven-story building. The entrance columns of the
front are fifty feet high in the clear.
The building is known as a steel skeleton, with reinforced
concrete construction, the entire exterior being of WHITE-
WATER LIGHT GRAY GRANITE, quarried near Grand
Junction, Colorado, cut and dressed in Denver. This granite
is a fine grain texture, slightly lighter than the granite in the
State Capitol Building and the new Colorado State Office
Building. Sub-contractor's bid on this granite alone is $1,-
487,000.00. The estimated time for construction is three years.
The work of construction was begun immediately after
the signing of the contract, and is now progressing rapidly.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY C. DAVIS, Chairman.
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COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
(EDIToR's No .- It is intended in each issue of DICTA to print brief abstracts of
the decisions of the Supreme Court. These abstracts will be printed only after the
time within which a petition for rehearing may be filed has elapsed without such ac-
tion being taken, or in the event that a petition for rehearing has been filed the abstract
will be printed only after the petition has been disposed of.)
CONDEMNATION-COMMISSIONERS TO VIEW PROPERTY-No.
12,316-Jennings vs. Board of County Commissioners-
Decided April 22, 1929.
Facts.-County Board sought to condemn land for a high-
way. Land was condemned in Court below without the ap-
pointment of commission for the purpose of viewing the prop-
erty.
Held.-The request for a commission must be made be-
fore steps are taken to ascertain the compensation and dam-
ages. Where the parties fail to make such request and cause
is tried to a Jury, the right to have a commission, if any exists,
is waived.
Judgment Affirmed.
MOOT CASE-LANDLORD AND TENANT-No. 12,233-Kahnt
vs. Caldwell-Decided April 22, 1929.
Facts.-The issues involved the date of expiration of the
tenancy of Caldwell, tenant on Kahnt's farm. This case was
formerly before the Court and Writ of Error was dismissed
for the reason that there was no final judgment. Final judg-
ment was then entered in the Court below and the case was
again brought to the Supreme Court. The lease expired
March 1, 1929.
Held.-That the lease, having expired March 1, 1929,
which was prior to the submission of the case to the Supreme
Court, the case has become moot and it is now too late to do
the parties any good.
Writ Dismissed.
DICTA
DAMAGES--ACT OF GOD--NEGLIGENCE-No. 12,077-Barlow
vs. The North Sterling Irrigation District-Decided April
22, 1929.
Facts.-Barlow sued the defendant for damages sustained
by reason of the flooding of his land. Judgment was for the
defendant. During a violent rain storm, the defendant's irri-
gation ditch broke and the water therefrom flowed over plain-
tiff's land causing damage.
Held.-To constitute a defense, the Act of God must be
the sole cause of the damage, and if negligence of the defend-
ant contributed to or cooperated with the Act of God in caus-
ing the damage, the defendant is liable. The Court below
should have instructed the Jury that, in order to constitute a
defense, the Act of God must have caused the damage without
any contributing negligence on the part of the defendant.
Judgment Reversed.
TRESPASS-EASEMENT FOR DITCH-No. 12,115-Abrams vs.
Calwell-Decided April 22, 1929.
Facts.-Abrams sued Calwell for damages for trespass.
Judgment for defendant below. Calwell claimed a right of
way over Abrams' land for two ditches to carry water. In a
former suit, title was quieted, but the description of the ditch
in controversy herein does not correspond with the descrip-
tion of the ditch in which title was quieted.
Held.-The Jury must have found that the easement de-
scribed in the Decree quieting title in the ditch was along the
line of the ditches claimed by Calwell and not as claimed by
Abrams. Although the evidence was somewhat unsatisfac-
tory, it is sufficient to support the verdict.
Judgment Affirmed.
DETERMINATION OF HEIRSHIP-MARRIAGE-INSANITY-NO.
12,323-Williams vs. Williams-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-This is a statutory proceeding for the ascertain-
ment and determination of heirship. The issue raised at the
DICTA
trial was the validity of the marriage of defendant in error on
account of insanity of other party.
Held.-After the death of the other party to this mar-
riage, the county court admitted the will to probate and by so
doing necessarily found the deceased to be of sound mind and
memory. The subsequent marriage revoked the will. The
court found below that the decedent at the time of the mar-
riage was mentally capable of contracting a lawful marriage
and the evidence is sufficient to support the findings.
Judgment Affirmed.
FRAUD AND DECEIT-BODY JUDGMENT-No. 12,100-Clark
vs. Giacomini-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff had a verdict and judgment for $3,-
120.00 upon a complaint charging false representations in the
sale of stock. Upon a finding in the verdict that, in commit-
ting the tort complained of, defendant was guilty of fraud and
willful deceit, the court ordered defendant incarcerated for
a period of four months or until the amount of the judgment
was paid.
Held.-Defendant, having given immaterial testimony, is
not in a position to object to testimony rebutting the same.
Instructions given to Jury were proper. Included in the judg-
ment was $870.00, which was allowed as interest upon $2,-
250.00, the sum alleged and found to have been paid out by
the plaintiff as a result of said false representations. Allow-
ance of interest was not within the Colorado Statute; judg-
ment modified by deducting the interest.
Judgment Modified and Affirmed.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-TEACHERS--DIRECTORS' MEETINGS--No.
12,054-Consolidated School District vs. Angus-Decided
April 29 1929.
Facts.-Angus, a teacher, recovered judgment against the
school district for wages due herself and upon two assigned
DICTA
causes of action for wages due others. Contract was made
during a time when the right of one of the directors to his
office was being questioned and at a time when the board meet-
ing was informally held.
Held.-The director was at least a de facto officer and his
act is as binding as that of a de jure officer. The board, having
adopted no by-laws and not having any formal rule with ref-
erence to the manner of calling special meetings, where the
members of the board had actual notice that a meeting was to
be held at a certain date, it was their duty to attend and under
such circumstances the same would be a legal meeting.
Judgment Affirmed.
FORECLOSURE-LOST NOTE-DEMURRER-No. 12,135-Mur-
ray vs. Ready-Decided April 29, 1929.
Facts.-Murray sued Ready to recover judgment on a
promissory note and to foreclose a Deed of Trust. The trial
court sustained a general demurrer to the complaint.
Held.-The demurrer is a general demurrer and should
not have been sustained. The fact that the note was lost or
stolen does not bar a suit on the note as plaintiff could be re-
quired to give an adequate indemnity bond. Plaintiff is en-
titled to a personal judgment even though in the same suit a
foreclosure of the Deed of Trust is sought.
Judgment Reversed and Remanded.
NON-SUIT-SALE OF STOCK-EVIDENCE-No. 12,008-The
Tax Service Corporation vs. Shoff-Decided April 29,1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff below, a stock salesman, recovered judg-
ment against the defendant, The Tax Service Corporation, and
C. W. Savery, in the sum of $10,000.00, said amount claimed
to have been earned as 20% commission for the sale of 4,000
shares of the capital stock of defendant corporation. Defend-
ants claim error in refusal of the Court to grant Motion for
non-suit and to direct a verdict for defendants.
DICTA
Held.--Plaintiff below failed completely to prove the
material allegations of his complaint. It was, therefore, error
to deny defendant's motion for a non-suit and to direct a Ver-
dict for the defendant.
Reversed and Remanded.
CONVERSION-AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-EXEMPLARY DAM-
AGES No. 12,098-The Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Com-
pany vs. Levy-Decided May 6, 1929.
Facts.-Levy brought an action in trover against the in-
surance company for the conversion by defendant of plaintiff's
automobile, and recovered actual and exemplary damages.
He carried a theft insurance policy. The car was stolen and
was recovered about a month later in damaged condition, and
the company retained possession of the car, refusing to deliver
it to the plaintiff until the amount of damages was agreed
upon and holding the car for a period of several months.
Held.-The company had a right to retain possession of
the car for a reasonable time in order to ascertain the damages,
but it had no right to create unnecessary delay nor to hold the
car for the purposes of forcing a settlement on terms dictated
by the insurer. The insurer held the car in this case for an
unreasonable length of time and was guilty of conversion. The
facts were sufficient in this case to sustain the award of exem-
plary damages also.
Judgment Affirmed.
JUDICIAL SALE- CAVEAT EMPTOR- No. 12,181 - Kreps vs.
Webster-Decided May 6, 1929.
Facts.-Judgment was rendered against plaintiff in error,
a defaulting bidder at a Sheriff's sale on execution, for $900.00,
being the difference between his bid and the amount realized
by the subsequent sale. He sought to avoid liability, claiming
that the sale was void, because the execution debtor had no
title to the property.
Held.-The doctrine of caveat emptor applies to a pur-
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chaser at an execution sale when the debtor has no title to the
property sold. A bidder at a Sheriff's sale cannot refuse to
pay his bid and take the property on the ground that the sale
will convey no title.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-MEDICAL TREATMENT-LIM-
ITATION No. 12,229-The John Thompson Grocery Stores
Company, et al vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado-
Decided May 6,1929.
Facts.-Employee was injured and necessarily expended
more than $200.00 in! medical treatment. This was caused by
several operations, the result of which operations was that he
wholly recovered. The Court Below found that, had he not
expended this additional amount for his recovery, he would
have lost the use of his leg below the knee; it allowed com-
pensation for one hundred thirty-nine weeks.
Held.-Since the Legislature has fixed the period of time
as sixty days and the amount at $200.00 for medical attention,
it is beyond the power of the Commission or the Court to
change this. While the employee incurred additional expense
above the $200.00 and is thereby fully restored, the Commis-
sion is without power to make a finding that had he not had
the medical attention he would have been entitled to compen-
sation on the ground that he might have lost his left leg at
the knee. Such a finding is not supported by the facts.
Judgment Reversed with Directions.
EQUITY - INJUNCTION - ADEQUATE RELIEF AT LAW - No.
12,235-Building Laborers International Protective Union
of America vs. International Hod Carriers Building and
Common Laborers Union-Decided May 6, 1929.
Facts.-Plaintiff in error brought suit below because of
defendant's alleged, unlawful interference with plaintiff's
ownership and possession of its real and personal property,
and prayed for restoration of its property and an injunction
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enjoining the defendants from interfering with the property.
Demurrer to the Complaint was sustained below.
Held.-The Complaint on its face showed that the plain-
tiff had an adequate remedy at law, in that the plaintiff, if the
proof supported the allegations, could get back its personal
property in an action of claim and delivery or common law
replevin, and could get back its real estate in the code action
to recover possession, which is common law ejectment. The
Demurrer was properly sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION-METHOD OF COMPUTATION-
No. J2,280-The Employers' Mutual Insurance Company
vs. The Industrial Commission-Decided May 6, 1929.
Facts.-Deceased was a coal miner. Industrial Commis-
sion awarded his widow compensation based on earnings of
deceased for one year preceding his death as a standard in
computing his average weekly wage. It was contended that
the six months' period should be used instead of one year.
Held.-Coal mining is a seasonable business and comput-
ing award on average weekly wages for wages earned during
the preceding six months would not be fair in a seasonable
industry. The commission was authorized to use one year as
a period instead of six months in this class of industry.
Judgment Affirmed.
RECENT TRIAL COURT DECISIONS
(EITOR's NoTE.-It is intended in each issue of Dicta to note any interesting de-
cisions of the United States District Court, the Denver District Court, the County
Court, the Juvenile Court, and occasionally the Justice Courts.)
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-Division 2, No. 104,432-People
of the State of Colorado on the Relation of M. H. Spiegle-
man and Simon Spiegleman vs. Jay T. Williams, as Chief
Building Inspector of the City and County of Denver-J.
C. Starkweather, Judge-Decided May 6, 1929.
Mandamus for building permit.
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Facts.-Relators are the owners of lots having a frontage
of 94Y2 feet and an area of 11812.5 square feet in "Residence
A District" under the "Zoning Ordinance". They sought to
erect a 7-family apartment house thereon. Respondent denied
application for building permit for the reason that the lots had
an insufficient area to meet the requirements of the "Zoning
Ordinance". Relators appealed the decision of respondent to
the Board of Adjustment which required the consent of 80%
of adjacent landowners, which could not be obtained. The
Board of Adjustment therefore denied the application.
The chief defenses relied on were as follows:
1. That the "Zoning Ordinance" was unreasonable, ar-
bitrary and discriminatory having no reasonable relation to
public health and morals and general welfare, and t~erefore
unconstitutional and invalid.
2. That as applied by respondent in this case, the par-
ticular restrictions in reference to "lot area" and "width of
lot" as prescribed in Sections 13 and 14 of the "Zoning Ordi-
nance" were unreasonable, arbitrary and discriminatory, and
therefore unconstitutional and void. In this connection evi-
dence was introduced to show
(a) That there were other apartment houses in this par-
ticular district being old houses converted into apartments.
However, it was admitted that these were constructed before
the "Zoning Ordinance" became effective.
(b) That there were other apartment buildings in a "Res-
idence C District" adjoining the "Residence A District" in
question.
(c) That unless the lots could be used for an apartment
building there would be considerable loss and depreciation
of value to relators.
Held.-I. The "Zoning Ordinance" is constitutional and
valid.
The presumption is that the provisions of a "Zoning Or-
dinance" are reasonable. The fact that other apartment houses
were constructed before the Ordinance became operative is of
no significance. The fact that there are apartments in an ad-
joining "Residence C District" is of no effect.
Application for a peremptory writ denied.
DICTA
DENVER DISTRICT COURT-Division 1, No. 9 4 ,3 2 6 -Jennie R.
Becker vs. B. Lutz--Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-De-
cided May 13, 1929.
Facts.-Defendant held a chattel mortgage on part of the
furniture in an apartment house. Through replevin he took
possession of all the furniture including furniture belonging
to the plaintiff not included in his mortgage, and rented all of
the apartments together with the contents thereof. Plaintiff
demanded the return of the goods belonging to him, but de-
fendant never complied. The plaintiff sues for conversion.
Held.-The defendant by wrongfully exercising domin-
ion over plaintiff's property had converted it. An offer by
defendant after the goods were converted to return the goods
to plaintiff is no defense. Plaintiff entitled to damages in the
sum of the value of the goods at the time of the conversion
together with legal interest thereon to the date of the judgment.
AERE PERENNIUS
The following list of attorneys who have been longest in
practice in Denver with the dates of their admissions to the
Colorado Bar has been prepared by Mr. S. S. Abbott:
George Q. Richmond ....................................... March 13, 1871
D. B. Graham .......... December 21, 1871
Charles S. Thomas .................................... December 23, 1871
H . E . L uthe ........................................................................ M ay 4, 1872
A . C . P helps ..................................................................... July 22, 1872
R. D. Thompson .......................................... November 13, 1878
J. N. Baxter ............... April 4, 1879
G ustave C. Bartels ................................................... A pril 12, 1879
J. H . B lood ..................................................................... M ay 24, 1879
Jacob F illius .................................................................. M ay 24, 1879
George Hodges ............................................... September 2, 1879
Harvey Riddell ............................................. September 29, 1879
J. P. Brockw ay ..................................................... October 1, 1879
John H. Denison .......... April 14, 1881
John H. Reddin .................................................. August 27, 1881
Frederick A. Williams .......................................... July 21, 1882
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Ben L. Pollock ......................................................... August 3, 1882
James E. Garrigues ....................................... February 27, 1883
C. A. Roberts .................................. April 6, 1883
E dw ard R ing .................................................................. M ay 18, 1883
E. C. Stimson ................................................... November 15, 1883
A. L. Doud .................... March 18, 1884
William B. Harrison ............................................. May 10, 1884
J. C. Starkweather ............................................. October 10, 1884
J. A. C. Reynolds ................................................... January 3, 1885
F rank Johnson ............................................................... July 29, 1885
H. V. Johnson ................................................ December 29, 1885
G rant L . H udson ............................................................ June 3,1886
0 . E . Jackson .................................................................. June 21, 1886
A. S. Frost .................. January 27, 1887
Charles L. Allen ................................................ January 28, 1887
R obert Pitkin ......................................................... February 8, 1887
George F. Dunklee ............. March 12, 1887
George C. Manly............... August 30, 1887
William Young ...................................................... October 4, 1887
J. R. Allphin ................................................... November 15, 1887
S. S. A bbott ............................................................ D ecem ber 2, 1887
WANTED: OLD NUMBERS OF THE
RECORD
The Harvard Law School at Cambridge, Massachusetts,
lacks the following numbers of the Denver Bar Association
Record. Members able and willing to furnish these numbers
to complete the Law School file may mail their copies to the
Editor.
Numbers 2 to 5, and 12, of Volume 1.
Numbers 1, 3, and 9 of Volume 3.
Number 9 of Volume 4.
